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RECENT DECISIONS
have committed or omitted to do something which in the case of an
adult would have constituted negligence.4 The negligence of a cus-
todian when not acting in that capacity is not chargeable to the child
ewen though it tends to expose the child to injury from other persons.5
A child being in a lawful place, and exercising what would be re-
garded as ordinary care in an adult is entitled to recover for an in-
jury occasioned by a wrongful act of another irrespective of the con-
duct of the parents. 6 Negligence of a guardian is not imputable to
an infant non sui juris who did nothing which would constitute
negligence.7
In the present case, if the court applied the rule, it would be
placed in an anomalous position of barring recovery to the adminis-
tratrix of the deceased child, while the other who was injured might
recover under the same circumstances. The court distinguishes the
act of custody from that of driving, in stating that custody ceased
at that moment the uncle placed the child in a safe position. As no
negligent act of commission or omission on the part of the child con-
tributed to the accident,8 the court rightly held that the doctrine of
imputable negligence is not applicable in this case.
A. R. L.
OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE--REvOCATION-QUALIFIED ACCEP-
TANCE-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.-After negotiations, plaintiff and
defendant met at the office of the attorney for the defendant where
an instrument for the sale of land was draw'n up and signed by
the defendant.- Plaintiff refused to sign at that time, saying:
"* * * everything is O.K. in the contract but will there be any ob-
jection there to have one of his contracts looked over by an
attorney?" No objection was made and it was attempted to leave
'Ihl v. Forty-second St. R. Co., 47 N. Y. 317 (1872); Cumming v. Brook-
lyn R. R. Co., 104 N. Y. 669, 10 N. E. 853 (1887) ; Lamb v. Ferrell, 125 Misc.
148, 209 N. Y. Supp. 365 (1925); Sullivan v. Chadwick, 236 Mass. 130, 127
N. E. 632 (1920).
1 McMahon v. New York, 33 N. Y. 642 (1865); Huerzeler v. Central
Crosstown R. Co., 1 Misc. 136, 20 N. Y. Supp. 676 (1892), aff'd, 139 N. Y.
490, 34 N. E. 1101 (1893); Hennessey v. Brooklyn R. R. Co., 6 App. Div.
207, 39 N. Y. Supp. 805 (2d Dept. 1896); Smith v. City Realty Co., 79 App.
Div. 441, 79 N. Y. Supp. 1116 (4th Dept. 1903); Regan v. International
R. R. Co., 205 App. Div. 425, 199 N. Y. Supp. 601 (4th Dept. 1923).
' Lannen v. Albany Gas Light Co., 44 N. Y. 459 (1871); McGarry v.
Loomis, 63 N. Y. 104 (1875); Serano v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., 188
N. Y. 156, 80 N. E. 1025 (1907); McNiel v. Boston Ice Co., 173 Mass. 570,
54 N. E. 257 (1899).7 Cavaliere v. Brooklyn City R. R. Co., 216 App. Div. 764, 214 N. Y. Supp
763 (2d Dept. 1926).8 Instant case.
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the contract in escrow with defendant's attorney. It was agreed
that the plaintiff would return at a later date at which time the
parties would exchange contracts. But, by that time defendant had
changed his mind and had torn up the instrument. On appeal, teld,
that no contract existed and therefore specific performance was de-
nied for there was no mutuality of obligation or of remedy;' that
the attempt to create an escrow was ineffectual.2  Farago v. Burke,
262 N. Y. 229, 186 N. E. 683 (1933).
Here is an exemplification of the misapplication of correct legal
principles to facts. It is concededly true that ordinarily an offer
made at a personal interview must be contemporaneously accepted. 3
But, in holding that there was no contract in fact, the court wholly
ignored the universal rule that, in the absence of a statute to the
contrary, an offeror, having allowed a definite time within which
the offer may be accepted or rejected, must give notice of revocation
of such offer to the offeree before there has been an acceptance by
the latter.4  Undoubtedly, such granting of an extension of time is
revocable 5 unless there be a consideration therefor 6 or it be under
seal.7 While at common law it was held that such gratuitous exten-
sion could be revoked at any time by an overt act so manifesting even
though not communicated, 8 that doctrine has long since been over-
'Levin v. Dietz, 194 N. Y. 376, 87 N. E. 454 (1909); Pomeroy v. Newell,
117 App. Div. 800, 102 N. Y. Snpp. 1098 (2d Dept. 1907) ; Kohart v. Boyle,
140 App. Div. 856, 125 N. Y. Supp. 567 (2d Dept. 1910).
2 Worrall v. Munn, 5 N. Y. 229 (1851); Bramen v. Bingham, 26 N. Y. 483
(1863) ; Day v. Lacasse, 85 Me. 242, 27 Atl. 124 (1892) ; Van Valkenberg v.
Allen, 111 Minn. 333, 126 N. W. 1092 (1910); Sargent v. Cooley, 12 N. D. 1,
94 N. W. 576 (1902) ; Easton v. Driscoll, 18 R. I. 318, 27 Atl. 445 (1893).
'1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1921) §54; 1 N. Y. LAW OF CONTRACTS(1922) §10; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §40(b).
'Infra note 9; Hamilton v. Patrick, 62 Hun 74, 16 N. Y. Supp. 578(1891); Pennsylvania & Delaware Oil Co. v. Klipstein, 175 N. Y. Supp. 540(1919) ; Boston & Maine R. R. v. Bartlett, 3 Cush. 224 (Mass. 1849) ; 1 PAGE,
CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1920) §134; 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1921) §56.
Schenectady Stove Co. v. Holbrook, 101 N. Y. 45, 4 N. E. 2 (1885)
Levin v. Dietz, supra note 1; Pettibone v. Moore, 75 Hun 461, 27 N. Y. Supp.
455 (1894); Pomeroy v. Newell, supra note 1; Ganss v. J. M. Guffey
Petroleum Co., 125 App. Div. 760, 110 N. Y. Supp. 176 (1st Dept. 1908); 1
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1921) §55. See Durkee v. Schultz, 122 Ia. 410,
98 N. W. 149 (1904); Nolin Milling Co. v. White Grocery Co., 168 Ky. 417,
182 S. W. 191 (1916).
'Scruggs v. Catterill, 67 App. Div. 583, 73 N. Y. Supp. 882 (1st Dept.
1902) ; Electric Fireproofing Co. v. Smith, 113 App. Div. 615, 99 N. Y. Supp.
37 (1st Dept. 1906); 1 PAGE, CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1920) §122; 1 WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS (1921) §61; 1 N. Y. LAW OF CONTRACTS (1922) §24.
' This applies to those jurisdictions wherein the seal still retains its efficacy.
1 PAGE, CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1920) §122; 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1921) §61.
In New York, the presence of a seal is but presumptive evidence of con-
sideration and may, therefore, be rebutted.
N. Y. C. P. A. (1920) §342.
8 Cooke v. Oxley, 3 Term Report 653 (1790).
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ruled.9 The modern rule obviously necessitates the adoption of the
theory of continuing offer since it is essential to every contract that
there be a meeting of the minds of the parties.' 0 It is inescapable
that the minds having met, as evidenced by some overt act,'1 there
exists a contract. Since there is a continuing offer 12 the minds of
the parties have met immediately upon the appropriate '3 manifesta-
tion of assent.14 Logically, the only way in which that result can
be prevented is by communicating a revocation, formal or actual, 15
"as direct and explicit as the acceptance" 16 to the offeree.17 If the
court is attempting the formulation of a new rule through the con-
sideration of this as an offer to enter into a unilateral contract 18
then its result may be justified on the grounds that such an offer
may be revoked at any time before the completion of the act of
acceptance. 19  But, such a construction is entirely against legal
principle.
20
There remains but one possible justification-that the words of
plaintiff be considered as a qualified acceptance. It is generally
stated that the conditional acceptance of an offer will be considered
' Tayloe v. Merchant's Fire Insurance Co., 9 How. 390 (U. S. 1850);
Patrick v. Bowman, 149 U. S. 411 (1893); Weld & Co. v. Victory Mfg. Co.,
205 Fed. 770 (E. D. N. C. 1913); Pennsylvania & Delaware Oil Co. v. Klip-
stein, supra note 4; Adams v. Lindsell, 1 Barnewell & Alderson 681 (1818);
Byrne & Co. v. Leon Van Tienhoven & Co., 5 C. P. D. 344 (1880).
1 Grierson v. Mason, 60 N. Y. 394 (1875) ; Dietz v. Farish, 79 N. Y. 520,
525 (1880) ; 300 West End Ave. Corp. v. Warner, 250 N. Y. 221, 165 N. E. 271
(1929); Zeltner v. Irwin, 25 App. Div. 228, 49 N. Y. Supp. 337 (1st Dept.
1898); Pomeroy v. Newell, supra note 1; Keller v. Holderman, 11 Mich. 248
(1863); McClurg v. Terry, 21 N. J. Eq. 225 (1870); Stamper v. Temple, 25
Tenn. (6 Hump.) 113 (1845). See Vitty v. Ely, 51 App. Div. 44, 64 N. Y.
Supp. 397 (4th Dept. 1900). Contra: see Williams v. Cowardine, 4 Barnewall
& Adolphus 621 (1833).
"Mactier v. Frith, 6 Wend. 103 (N. Y. 1830) ; White v. Corlies, 46 N. Y.
467 (1871); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §20. See 1 N. Y. LAW oF CONTRACTS(1922) §§44, 45.
'Supra note 9.
Eliason v. Henshaw, 4 Wheat. 225 (U. S. 1819); Crompton, etc., Loom
Works v. Hornsy, 204 App. Div. 475, 198 N. Y. Supp. 478 (1st Dept. 1923);
Seymour v. Armstrong, 10 Kan. App. 12, 61 Pac. 675 (1900); Wiswell v.
Bresnahan, 84 Me. 397, 24 Atl. 885 (1892) ; Vermont Marble Co. v. Mead, 85
Vt. 32, 80 Atl. 852 (1911) ; 1 N. Y. LAW OF CONTRACTS (1922) §§55-58.
" Adams v. Lindsell, supra note 9; Hallock v. Commercial Insurance Co.,
26 N. J. L. 268, 281 (1857) ; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §34.
'Pomeroy v. Newell, supra note 1; J. L. Owens Co. v. Bemis, 22 N. D.
159, 133 N. W. 59 (1911) ; Dickinson v. Dodds, 2 Ch. Div. 463 (1876) ; 1 PAGE,
CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1920) §132; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §42.
10 Linn v. McLean, 80 Ala. 360, 366 (1887).
Supra notes 4 and 9.
"Farago v. Burke, 237 App. Div. 351, 261 N. Y. Supp. 501, dissenting
opinion, per Finch, P.J.
" Petterson v. Pattberg, 248 N. Y. 86, 161 N. E. 428 (1928); Durkin v.
City of New York, 49 Misc. 114, 96 N. Y. Supp. 1059 (1905); 1 WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS (1922) §60. Contra: Los Angeles Traction Co. v. Wilshire, 135
Cal. 654, 67 Pac. 1086 (1902); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §45.
1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1921) §60; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §31.
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as a counter-offer, thus amounting to a rejection.21 In order that
a binding contract be thereafter entered into, it is necessary that an
acceptance of such counter-offer be made.2 2  Undoubtedly, if the
attempted acceptance in any way alters the context of the original
offer, then it is conditional.23 But, it is well recognized that the
mere addition of a hope or an expectation of some additional benefit
will not be construed as such alteration.2 4  If we are to adopt the
construction that a mere request for an extension of time so as to
permit an attorney to look over the papers is a qualified acceptance,
then we shall find ourselves outside of recognized principles. 25
W. E. S.
"National Bank v. Hall, 101 U. S. 43 (1879); Minneapolis, etc., Railway
Co. v. Columbus Rolling Mill Co., 119 U. S. 149 (1886) ; Vassar v. Camp, 11
N. Y. 441 (1850); Chicago & G. E. R. Co. v. Dane, 43 N. Y. 240 (1870);
Barrow Steamship Co. v. Mexican C. R. Co., 134 N. Y. 15, 31 N. E. 261
(1892); Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 216 N. Y. 310, 110 N. E. 619
(1915) ; Mactier v. Frith, supra note 11; Sidney Glass Works v. A. S. Barnes
& Co., 86 Hun 374, 33 N. Y. Supp. 508 (N. Y. 1895) ; Mahar v. Compton, 18
App. Div. 536, 45 N. Y. Supp. 1126 (4th Dept. 1897); Zucker v. Perkins
Hosiery Mills, 141 Misc. 723, 253 N. Y. Supp. 67 (1931); Porter v. Gossell,
112 Ark. 380, 166 S. W. 533 (1914); 1 PARSONS, CONTRACTS (7th ed. 1883)
507. See Denver v. New York Trust Co., 229 U. S. 123 (1912).
' Sloan v. Wolf Co., 124 Fed. 196 (C. C. A. 8th, 1903) ; Bank of Buchanan
County v. Continental National Bank of Los Angeles, 277 Fed. 385 (C. C. A.
8th, 1921); James Curran Mfg. Co. v. Aultman, etc., Machinery Co., 62 App.
Div. 201, 70 N. Y. Supp. 1074 (1st Dept. 1901), af'd, 172 N. Y. 623, 65 N. E.
1118 (1902); E. Richard Meinig Co. v. United States Fastener Co., 200 App.
Div. 522, 193 N. Y. Supp. 106 (lst Dept. 1922); 1 PAGE, CONTRACTS (2d ed.
1920) §184; 1 WILLISTON, CONTACTS (1921) §77. See Sanders v. Pottlitzer
Bros. Fruit Co., 144 N. Y. 209, 30 N. E. 75 (1894).
'James v. Darley, 100 Fed. 224 (C. C. A. 8th, 1900); Mahar v. Compton,
supra note 21.
, Mactier v. Frith, supra note 11; American Woolen Co. v. Moscowitz,
159 App. Div. 382, 144 N. Y. Supp. 532 (lst Dept. 1913); Dunlop v. Higgins,
H. L. 381 (1848); Stevenson, Jacques & Co. v. McLean, 5 Q. B. D. 346
(1880) ; 1 PAGE, CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1920) §§78, 178; 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
(1921) §79; cf. Horgan v. Russell, 24 N. D. 490, 140 N. W. 99 (1913).
'Morse v. Tillotson & W. Co., 253 Fed. 340 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918) ; Vought
v. Williams, 120 N. Y. 253, 24 N. E. 195 (1890); Bennett v. Cummings, 73
Kan. 647, 85 Pac. 755 (1906); Cavender v. Waddingham, 5 Mo. App. 457
(1878) ; Curtis Land & Loan Co. v. Interior Land Co., 137 Wis. 341, 118 N. W.
656 (1908) ; 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1921) §78. See Nolan v. Whitney, 88
N. Y. 648 (1882) ; Doll v. Noble, 116 N. Y. 230, 23 N. E. 406 (1889) ; Horgan
v. Russell, supra note 24; Hussey v. Horne-Payne, L. R. 8 Ch. Div. 670 (1878) ;
cf. Village of Fort Edward v. Fish, 56 Hun 578, 33 N. Y. Supp. 784 (N. Y.
1895), aff'd, 156 N. Y. 363, 50 N. E. 976 (1898); James v. Darley, supra
note 23.
